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Abstract 
 
Classical theories of competition in two-dimensional space mainly deal with the 
questions of where firms locate in the plane and what shape their market areas will 
consequently adopt. Out of that develops the construct of catchment areas. As part of 
long-term infrastructure equipment, an airport can not change location. Once it is 
chosen and operational, an airport has to compete for passengers and market share on 
basis of its prevailing catchment areas. Passenger choice determines the shape of an 
airport’s market and these markets, other than in the presented theories, commonly 
overlap. On the basis of passengers’ selection criterions, the valuation of an airport’s 
attraction takes place. The developed procedure is applied to the state of Baden-
Württemberg. It paints a picture of airport competition in the German Southwest. In 
order to get a sharper image, the formed catchment areas are subdivided into zones of 
different competition intensity. 
 
JEL-Classifications: L93, R41 
Keywords: Airport, catchment area, spatial competition 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany has one of the densest airport networks in Europe. 
Seen before the background of an emerging competition within the European airport 
industry, this means new challenges for the future of airports in Germany. First steps 
have been done, as the privatization of a few airports shows. But this will not be the only 
changes to come. Low Cost Carriers are emerging in Germany, and this will be a 
chance for smaller airports with spare capacity. On the other hand, these airports are in 
danger of becoming dependent on some air carriers. Another way of creating new 
business is to focus on freight services. The airport of Leipzig is developing as a hub for 
DHL, a subsidy of the  Deutsche Post. This strategy is possible especially for airports 
that have no operational constraints during night time. Here, smaller airports could even 
compete with large hub-airports as Frankfurt, which are facing operational and capacity 
constraints. Competition with hubs is only feasible for regional airports, when it comes 
to competition for certain businesses. Regarding the number of services and 
destinations offered, competition among hubs and regional airports differs. Hub airports 
are concerned with a wider catchment area. They are competing on a European level. 
On the regional level, competitive pressure is rising, because many former military air 
fields are waiting to be converted into civil airports. In some cases regional governments 
are trying to promote these new airports, without having a closer look at costs, existing 
competitive forces and a modest future for their new airport. 
This paper discusses the meaning of competition among airports on a regional base. It 
creates a picture of the current situation of competition for the Southwest part of 
Germany, in particular the state of Baden-Württemberg. 
Starting point for the considerations is the nature of competition in two-dimensional 
space. From this theoretical base, a model of decision-making is constructed. The 
factors which influence passengers the most, when deciding for an airport, flow into a 
ranking system to describe airport significance. 
 
II. The theory of spatial competition 
 
1. Competition in one-dimensional space 
 
Firms choosing a location on a predefined interval with evenly distributed customers try 
to reach as many of them as possible. In a duopolistic environment, they end up in a so-
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called “back-to-back-solution” in the middle of the interval. This is a Nash-equilibrium1 of 
the underlying location game. The solution is also known as the principle of minimum 
differentiation and is used to explain spatial as well as non-spatial topics (e.g. matters of 
product differentiation), however it is not a social optimum, because the sum of 
transportation costs for customers is not minimised. The conditions for a social optimum 
require an equal distribution of n firms over the whole interval. That implies a catchment 
area of 1/n for each company.2 
In contrast to the interval, the circle is an unlimited space. The socially optimal evenly 
distributed firms are also a Nash-equilibrium, but just one out of many. Another form of 
equilibrium contains a pair-wise arrangement of firms, back-to-back, as seen above.3 
Collusion is profitable, if the participants comprise more than half and less then all of the 
companies in the market4. 
 
2. Competition in two-dimensional space 
 
The following section concisely portrays important classical theories about location and 
competition in two-dimensional space. In what follows, it is assumed that customers are 
distributed equally in the plane.  
Cost-based theories suppose that firms have to serve a given demand with fixed prices. 
A profit-maximizing strategy is focused on finding the optimal location from where the 
market can be delivered with minimum costs. 
Von Thünen developed his theory on an agricultural framework5. Here the conditions for 
producing several goods are the same around the plane. The goods have to be 
transported to the market place in a centrally located city. Choosing the optimal location 
is based on different cost schemes. Facing costs for production and transportation, 
goods with the minimum overall costs close to town will be produced in the inner circle 
surrounding the city. The producers of these goods have the highest willingness to pay 
for land. In the end, a system of concentric circles around the city develops, each one 
concentrating on the production of specific goods. Figure 1 illustrates von Thünen’s 
circles. 
The theory is also used to explain the structure and development of urban areas6. 
                                                 
1 See Hotelling (1929), p. 45ff; Okabe/Aoyagi (1991), p. 364. 
2 See Eaton/Lipsey (1975), p. 29ff. 
3 See Eaton/Lipsey (1975), p. 31f. 
4 See Huck/Knoblauch/Müller (2003), p. 501f. 
5 See von Thünen (1826), p. 2ff, 128ff, 175ff. 
6 See Fujita/Krugman/Venables (1999), p. 15ff. 
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 Figure 1: The system of circles after von Thünen 
 
 
 
Source: D.Strobach, following Fujita/Krugman/Venables (1999), p. 16 
 
Weber focused on the location choice of industrial companies when sources of raw 
material and the market place geographically break up7. If prices for raw material and 
labour are fixed, transportation cost are the relvant factor. They vary, depending on 
quantity and distance. Around all the different centres of resources and market, it is 
                                                 
7 See Weber (1922), p. 41ff. 
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possible to draw lines of equal cost. By means of these isocost  lines, the most cost-
efficient location can be found. Usually the place of production is located between 
different sources of raw materials and the market place. If transportation costs are 
extreme for one material or the manufactured good, the production site ends up at the 
specific source or straight at the market place. 
The shape of market areas was introduced by Lösch8. He expanded the frame by 
focusing on oligopolistic markets in combination with ideas from monopolistic 
competition. Consumer demand is described by a demand curve with negative slope 
Preferences and income are identical for all consumers. The conditions for production at 
any place and transportation in any direction are homogeneous. The manufactured 
good sells within a circular catchment area (Figure 2a) whose size is limited by 
increasing transport costs and, therefore, increasing prices. Existing companies make 
profit at this stage, so new firms are attracted. Catchment areas decrease and move 
closer together (Figure 2b). Formally, the demand curve shifts to the left until 
Chamberlin’s tangential solution is reached. During this process, the shape of 
catchment areas changes. Overlapping markets are not possible, and a network of 
circular catchment areas does not cover the whole plane. But a hexagonal net fulfils this 
condition, so a company´s catchment area takes on the form of a hexagon and all 
potential costumers are served (Figure 2c). Market entries occur and catchment areas 
shrink until equilibrium is reached and profits are eliminated (Figure 2d). 
 
Figure 2: The development of a hexagonal network 
 
 
Source: Lösch (1962), p. 75. 
                                                 
8 See Lösch (1962), p. 71ff. 
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A result of Lösch’s theory is that firms spread through the plane and try to cover the 
whole demand. On the other hand, cost advantages of agglomeration lead to a certain 
degree of concentration within an industry, an effect observed in reality. To find an 
explanation for this phenomenon, the assumption of equal costs at any place has to be 
given up. Firms tend to choose places with low costs as their production site. Market 
participants who are not able to realise economies of scale, can settle at more distant 
places where they can develop a smaller market, apart from the large companies. The 
large ones can not compete with their cheaper offers, because of the higher 
transportation costs to distant places. Consequently distance and transportation costs 
are a kind of protection against larger competitors. Conversely, if all manufacturers are 
large in size and able to realise economies of scale, there will be a tendency to produce 
in cost-efficient and demand-intensive locations and to compete directly against each 
other. Incomplete information about whether there are favourable locations leads to 
concentration in one place. Equal cost conditions and differentiation of company size 
cause a tendency of firms spreading around the plane.9 
As discussed above, the theory of Lösch shows that hexagonal network is an 
equilibrium. Now the question arises whether this type of catchment area is the only 
stable solution. Other geometrical shapes, like rectangles, squares and triangles, could 
also form a network which covers the whole plane. A square and hexagonal lattice 
makes up a global equilibrium. That means the whole market or network is stable. 
Beside the Löschian explanation for hexagons, Knoblauch10 gives a geometrical proof 
that a square will establish a strict Nash-equilibrium. Rectangles and oblong hexagons 
could only set up a local equilibrium, which means the network is stable only within a 
sufficient vicinity of the firm under consideration. Triangular networks have an incentive 
built in for the firms to deviate. They are unstable and can not make an equilibrium11.  
The results above are valid for a market without entry. If market entry is possible, firms 
enter the market as long as profits are achievable and the market reaches a certain 
density. Then the process stops. It could take several rounds to bring the market back 
into stable conditions. Two rounds are needed for a square lattice to form another stable 
square lattice. The number of market participants then have been multiplied by four. A 
network of regular hexagons needs three rounds to become a new equilibrium, but not 
identical in shape. Then there will be as many as twelve times the number of firms 
before. These processes can only run until there are no profits. Thus, it is not sure, 
                                                 
9 See Greenhut/Norman/Hung (1987), p. 267ff. 
10 See Knoblauch (2002), p. 46ff. 
11 See Okabe/Aoyagi (1991), p. 351f, 360ff. 
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whether the process runs long enough to end up in a new stable state. If the new 
entrants can change their location, the process needs only one round to reach an 
equilibrium in a network of regular hexagons.12 
As a global equilibrium, square- and especially hexagonal networks form a solution in 
two-dimensional space, which is closer to social equilibrium than in one dimension, as 
transport costs are minimized.13 
All results so far consider an unlimited plane. If the plane is limited and it takes on a 
shape with x corners, the Löschian system is disturbed. Possibly firms in limited 
markets have an permanent incentive to wander around, which leads to an oscillating 
behaviour. The closer the market comes to a disk (x→∞), the higher is the likelihood for 
a balanced solution. One or two firms settle in the middle of the disk. Other companies 
form a settlement of concentric rings, without regular shape for the catchment areas. It 
is very unlikely that all firms form one circle, as this arrangement is unstable. An 
interesting case is the rectangular market (x=4). Within a square, there does not exist 
an equilibrium configuration. The more unequal the ratio of sides, the more likely is a 
reproduction of a balanced configuration along the symmetry axis of the market, 
comparable to those in one-dimensional space.14 
The next step is to include price, transportation cost and demand into the considerations 
of location choice. These factors are of special interest, if the urban agglomeration and 
the geographical centre of a market fall apart. In the case of concave transportation 
costs, i.e. if there are economies of long haul, a firm settles at the urban centre of the 
market. Because of decreasing marginal transportation costs, the supply of customers 
in the periphery can be handled under acceptable conditions. In the reverse case, if 
costs are convex, firms tend to settle at the geographic centre, since the supply of the 
outskirts of the market is more expensive. Convex demand leads to a concentration of 
competitiors, while concave demand causes a tendency to spread in space. The effect 
of choosing a production site in the urban centre strengthens, if costs are concave and 
demand convex. If the conditions are the other way round, there is a stronger tendency 
to settle near the geographic centre of the market. If both components are concave or 
convex, the outcome is not predictable.15 
The final price contains a factor α that determines to which degree transportation costs 
are passed on to consumers. In a duopolistic market, firms compete for the customers 
                                                 
12 See Eaton/Lipsey (1976), p. 80ff. 
13 See Okabe/Aoyagi (1991), p. 365f. 
14 See Aoyagi/Okabe (1993), p. 266, 270, 275ff; Eaton/Lipsey (1975), p. 40ff. 
15 See Greenhut/Norman/Hung (1987), p. 275ff. 
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located between them. While being able to decide freely about α, they try to differentiate 
prices and increase their profit. But on the other hand, they have an incentive to 
decrease prices in the competitive zone. Therefore, competition law enforces collusive 
behaviour as well as price dumping.16 
 
III. Reality and theory – the development of catchment areas 
 
1. Catchment areas and competition 
 
All the models mentioned above employ quite restrictive conditions, which seem very 
much an ideal case in comparison to the geography and topography of the real world. 
Proceeding on the assumption that the surface is a plane, where travelling in all 
directions is possible under unique cost and time conditions, this leads to a distinction 
between the market areas of different firms. The theoretical result is a network of strictly 
divided monopolistic areas. But topography causes the emergence of a traffic axis, 
which means that different travel directions are connected with varying cost and time 
components. A strict divison of market areas and the existence of regularly shaped 
networks is not likely under these premises. 
Catchment areas, as a synonym for market areas, play a vital role in the airport 
business. The term describes a geographical space, within which the probability of 
selection is so high that the majority of potential passengers living in the region decide 
for this particular airport. In other words, an airport gets the bulk of its traffic volume out 
of this area. Catchment areas are not static structures. They can vary, caused by 
changes in determinant factors. What these factors are is the subject of the next 
section. Also, catchment areas are overlapping.17 The definition via the probability of 
choosing a particular airport shows that other alternatives are imposed with positive 
probabilities as well. A point in space could rarely be assigned to one airport solely.  
Competition among airports is based on catchment areas. Irregularity in shape is 
typical, and overlapping is vital in this process. Location plays an important role in 
competition, but airports are immobile. Once a location has been chosen, this strategic 
decision can not be changed. If a firm can not be shifted, it has to rely on the flexibility of 
its customers. Thus passengers’ recognition and decision for an airport determine its 
catchment area, market share, revenue and profit. 
                                                 
16 See Greenhut/Norman/Hung (1987), p. 280ff. 
17 See Zeike (2003), p. 71f. 
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2. Relevant factors 
 
Certain factors make up an airports’ recognition and cause the existence of a positive 
choice probability. These factors determine to which extent passengers choose a 
specific airport and, therefore, strongly influence the dimension and shape of catchment 
areas, as well as competition among airports. 
For the discovery and description of factors that are important for passenger’s choice, 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) or Nested MNL (NMNL) can be used18. Because a broad 
database is necessary for such investigations, many examinations rely on a survey 
covering the San Francisco Bay Area in 199519. Within the scope of most of these 
investigations, the quality of airport access, offered frequency of flights and price are 
emphasized as the most important factors20. When analyzing an airport, these and 
additional factors are the base of competition. Passengers are influenced by these 
parameters, choose a particular airport on this basis and thus determine market share. 
The most common factors are21: 
• Airport Access Quality: This factor can be described by values of time, distance 
and cost. While it is relatively easy to transform distance into monetary 
dimensions, this is much more controversial when it comes to the valuation of 
time. Usually the ways reaching an airport are divided into private and public 
transport. Access time is an important, maybe the central factor, in airport 
competition. It can be shown that access time reaches higher elasticities 
concerning choice probability and market share than flight frequency22. The 
importance of access time may vary according to flight length. On short-haul 
routes, access time becomes a higher weight in relation to total travel time than it 
does on long-haul or intercontinental routes. Thus it is a more important criterion 
on short- or medium-haul routes, for instance national or European traffic, as on 
intercontinental routes23. One explanation for these high values of access time 
could be risk minimization. Long access times and distances increase the risk of 
delays and missing a flight. 
                                                 
18 An overview on the different models can be found in Bondzio (1996), p. 11ff. 
19 Study on the San Francisco Bay Area: Basar/Bhat (2004), p. 895ff; Hess/Polak (2004), p. 4ff; 
Pels/Nijkamp/Rietveld (1998), p. 6ff – Study on extension of Sheffield Airport: Thompson/Caves (1993), p. 138ff – 
Study on airport access in Southern Germany: Bondzio (1996), p. 42ff. 
20 See Harvey (1987), p. 443ff; Cohas/Belobaba/Simpson (1995), p. 41ff; and the sources mentioned in the previous 
footnote. 
21 Essential to this topic are the sources contained in the last two footnotes. 
22 See Basar/Bhat (2004), p. 899f. 
23 See Harvey (1987), p. 448. 
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• Frequency: Airports offer their passengers a variety of flights and destinations. 
Beside the number of destinations, reachable via direct connections, the 
frequency of flights is the decisive parameter. Flights are originally supplied by 
airlines. It is their competition parameter to reach or maintain market share on 
specific routes or airports. Airlines have an incentive to compete by offering a 
dense network of services, which is of advantage to the airport. These try to 
attract airlines in order to proffer an attractive supply. From an airports’ point of 
view, an optimal timetable contains a sufficient number of flights. At minimum a 
pair of flights should be offered per day. Flight frequency has a decreasing 
marginal utility. Nine flights per day can be seen as a kind of saturation point. As 
access time and frequency are the most important factors, the tendency is that if 
two airports offer a similar number of flights, travellers choose on the basis of 
other factors, most likely the nearest airport.24 
• Air Fare: Beside the two parameters above, air fare seems to be very important, 
although not all studies verify this assumption25. Air fare causes severe problems 
in data collection. That is the reason why many authors do not include it in their 
studies. Airlines offer different service categories and use for price differentiation. 
Ticket prices may vary with time, capacity and category. Thus accuracy in data 
collection is hard to reach.  
• Experience: This is a subjective element in airport choice. Positive experiences 
with a specific airport increase the probability that the passenger will choose this 
airport again in the future. But the question how to measure experience is 
difficult. 
• Tax: Total air fare contains charges and taxes, which may differ between 
airports. 
• Type of Aircraft: Despite their economic efficiency on short-haul routes, many 
passengers prefer jet-propelled to propeller driven planes26. 
• Aircraft Size: Larger aircraft are linked with higher comfort. 
• Delays and Punctuality: These points describe inconvenience and the risk of 
missing a flight. 
A common distinction separates business and leisure travel. In general, business 
travellers are more time-sensitive, and leisure travellers more cost-sensitive. Business 
                                                 
24 See Cohas/Belobaba/Simpson (1995), p. 34, 39; Harvey (1987), p. 446ff; Hess/Polak (2005), p. 63f; 
Thompson/Caves (1993), p. 143, Zeike (2003), p. 78f. 
25 Pro: Thompson/Caves (1993), p. 139, 145; Contra: Pels/Nijkamp/Rietveld (2003), p. 79. 
26 For Innes/Doucet (1990), p. 514f this factor is of high relevance. 
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travellers are more likely to accept higher fares in exchange for higher frequencies27. 
Local residents have a broader base of knowledge and experience. They sensitively 
react on changes in access quality and air fare. Visitors mainly focus on access time28. 
 
IV. Development of a model to describe competition among airports 
 
1. Outlining the goals and course of action 
 
Passengers choose their preferred airport based on the attributes described above. 
They thus influence shape and size of an airport’s catchment area and its market share. 
Passenger’s preferences establish the foundation of competition among airports. These 
preferences, more exactly the attributes and factors they are based on, are used in the 
following sections to model competition among airports. This is done in a general form, 
which makes the model easier to handle, because of adjusted requirements for the data 
material that is needed. The design also allows a repetition at any time, if the basic facts 
change, and an analysis of other regions. 
This study covers Baden-Württemberg. To develop a spatial reference, the state of 
Baden-Württemberg is subdivided into cells, based on existing administrative districts. 
Within these, the administrative centre of a district usually reflects the centre of 
economy and population and, therefore, serves as a reference point for the 
determination of access quality. In special cases, the reference point or divison of 
districts can vary, if suitable29. A problem concerning the transfer of information related 
to one specific point into space automatically arises. The finer the subdivision, the more 
accurate the information is. But improved accuracy implies higher expenditures. 
A ranking method is used to rate all values of a specific factor. The score reaches from 
9 for the best to 1 for the worst performer. These score values are weighted and 
accumulated. At the end, this method leads to one value per cell and airport. This can 
be interpreted as a measure of an airport’s attraction concerning a particular cell. 
Conclusions about competition among airports and their catchment areas can be 
derived from comparing the results. 
The factors used in the present study are grouped into a cell-specific and an airport-
specific part. The cell-specific part measures the connection between an airport (as a 
point in space) and a geographically differentiated area. This is done on the basis of 
                                                 
27 See Hess/Polak (2005), p. 65f; Pels/Nijkamp/Rietveld (2003), p. 79. 
28 See Harvey (1987), p. 440; Hess/Polak (2005), p. 66. 
29 For a closer look on the division, see Table 4 and Figures 3 and 4. 
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attributes concerning access quality. Airport-specific factors assess the airport itself. On 
one side is traffic supply, with flight frequency as the most important attribute. 
Connected to this point are factors which describe the conducting of traffic. On the other 
side are attributes concerning the convenience of an airport. They measure how stress-
free and entertaining an airport’s design is for travellers. At the end, the evaluation of 
airports as a point in space is combined with the assessment of airport access. These 
results have a multidimensional shape, reflecting competition in space. 
Passenger’s preferences and an airports’ attractiveness for travellers are useful 
indicators of competition, but are not a perfect measure. Ideally, the results should be 
compared with data reflecting traffic streams on a regional base, i.e. passenger’s origin 
at selected airports as well as the alternative travellers of a specific region are currently 
choosing. Although at least the latter information is difficult to obtain, a detailed 
verification on the basis of such data is an important topic of further research. The 
present study has to be considered as a first approximation to the spatial dimension of 
airport competition, not as an exact measure, while keeping in mind the overall goals 
mentioned above. 
 
2. Selection of attributes 
 
The following chapter is an overview on selected factors. 
Airport access can be measured in quantities of time, distance and cost. In the case of 
private transport, distance can be transferred into cost using a linear function. However, 
this is difficult, because prices for gasoline and the use of a particular type of car has to 
be determined. Therefore, only distance and time are calculated. Cost is not 
considered. It is assumed that a passenger leaves a train station at a reference point at 
nine o’clock in the morning and prefers a quick routing. Regarding public transport, 
ticket prices (regular tariffs) and travel times are calculated. The passenger leaves the 
mentioned train station around eight o’clock with the fastest connection possible. If an 
airport has no mainline station, the connecting services are added and a transfer time of 
10 minutes is included.30 
Flight frequency is the most important factor within the bounds of airport-specific 
attributes. With overlapping catchment areas, direct connections (point to point) are of 
main interest. To equalize the conditions for all airports under view, the present study 
                                                 
30 Private transport elements are calculated using an actual commercially available digital road map. The internet 
website of Deutsche Bahn AG (www.diebahn.de) and municipal transport services are used to calculate the access 
via public transport. Thursday august 25th is the fixed date.  
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concentrates on destinations in Germany and Europe (Table 1). The most frequently 
served destinations from the centrally located airport of Stuttgart31 constitute the starting 
point. The inclusion of the main administrative and economical centres, as well as 
popular destinations of low cost carriers, guarantee a balanced choice. Principal 
destinations of package holidays are excluded. Only Northern German cities are 
included in order to minimize intermodal competition. 
 
Table 1: Worldwide arrivals at selected European airports, 2004 
 
Destination/ 
Airport Code Passengers 
Germany 
Schönefeld SXF 3.382.166 
Tegel TXL 11.048.000 Berlin 
Tempelhof THF 441.580 
Düsseldorf  DUS 15.256.500 
Hamburg  HAM 9.893.700 
Hannover  HAJ 5.249.169 
Europe 
Amsterdam  AMS 42.541.200 
Barcelona  BCN 24.549.600 
Brüssel  BRU 15.583.700 
Budapest  BUD 6.444.700 
Graz  GRZ 898.504 
Atatürk International IST n/a Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen SAW n/a 
Kopenhagen  CPH 18.965.700 
City LCY n/a 
Gatwick LGW 31.461.500 
Heathrow LHR 67.344.000 
Luton LTN 7.500.000 
London 
Stansted STN 20.908.100 
Bergamo BGY 3.334.161 
Linate LIN 8.947.900 Mailand 
Malpensa MXP 18.554.000 
Palma de Mallorca  PMI 20.410.900 
Orly ORY 24.032.200 Paris Charles de Gaulle CDG 50.860.600 
Prag  PRG 9.696.413 
Wien  VIE 14.785.500 
 
Source: ACI (2005), Internet websites of the subject airports. 
 
                                                 
31 See Flughafen Stuttgart GmbH (2005), p. 28. 
 14
As a criterion for flight frequency, the number of flights per week are measured for the 
summer period 200532. Two flights per day are the minimum and 9 flights per day are a 
saturation point. With a number of just 6 connections per day at the weekend, this leads 
to a saturation level of 57 flights per week. Less than 14 flights per week have the 
lowest value, while 57 flights or more have the highest. This range is divided evenly. 
Additional factors concern the handling of traffic. Minimum Connecting Time (MCT) and 
the number of gates and check-in-counters describe the ability to process passengers 
without delays and to ensure a stable process control. MCT defines the time range in 
which an airport guarantees the transfer of passengers and luggage from one flight to 
another. The lower the danger of a negative experience for passengers, the more likely 
it is that they will make the same choice again. 
 
Table 2: Share of individual factors 
 
Factors Share of Final Results (%) 
Access Quality    50 
     Private Transport 
            Distance 
            Time 
 
     Public Transport 
            Expense 
            Time 
  27,5 
 13,75 
 13,75 
 
  22,5 
 11,25 
 11,25 
Airport Quality    50 
Traffic Supply and Handling 
 
     Frequency 
     Minimum Connecting Time 
     Gates 
     Check-In 
   42,5 
 
  36,125 
  2,125 
  2,125 
  2,125 
Convenience 
 
     Parking Space 
            Expense per Week 
            Expense per Day 
            Total Supply of Parking Space 
 
     Terminal Area 
     Area for Shopping and Services 
   7,5 
 
  2,55 
 0,765 
 0,765 
 1,02 
 
  2,475 
  2,475 
 
Source: D. Strobach 
 
 
                                                 
32 Timetables published (via internet) by the airports in question make up the source for the survey. A flight was 
taken into consideration if it was offered for more than half of the period. 
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Table 3: Presentation of airports included in the study 
 
Airport Code Passen-gers 
Freight 
(to) 
Aircraft 
Move-
ments 
Ownership structure 
Basel BSL 2.545.687 88.312 57.915
50% République 
francaise 
50% Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft 
Frankfurt FRA 51.098.300 1.750.996 477.475
31,9% Land Hessen 
20,4% Stadt Frankfurt 
18,3% Bundesrepublik  
           Deutschland 
29,4% Free Float 
Friedrichs-
hafen FDH 500.892 - 7.884
25% Stadt 
Friedrichshafen 
24,75% Bodenseekreis 
16,14% ZF Friedrichs-
hafen AG 
13,23% Luftschiffbau-
Zeppelin GmbH 
20,88% other 
shareholders 
Innsbruck INN 728.138 3.957 39.377
49% Innsbrucker 
Kommunalbetriebe 
25,5% Land Tirol 
25,5% Stadt Innsbruck 
München MUC 26.814.500 309.828 359.568
51% Freistaat Bayern 
26% Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 
23% Stadt München 
Nürnberg NUE 3.648.580 71.000 71.818 50% Freistaat Bayern 50% Stadt Nürnberg 
Strasbourg SXB 1.942.296 - -
Under the management 
of CCI Strasbourg & 
Bas-Rhin 
Stuttgart STR 8.821.533 18.227 125.220
50% Land Baden-
Württemberg 
50% Stadt Stuttgart 
Zürich ZRH 17.214.500 363.537 231.086
46,76% Kanton Zürich 
5,4% Stadt Zürich 
47,84% Free Float 
 
Note: Data reflects the year 2004. 
Source: Internet websites and company reports of the concerning airports, ACI. 
 
A second part of the valuation of an airport’s quality focuses on convenience for 
passengers. This relates to the positive experience passengers should get. Most 
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passengers still reach an airport by car33. Price for and number of parking lots may be a 
good indicator to judge whether convenient conditions exist or not. Concerning costs, 
the cheapest price per day and week were measured. The number of parking lots was 
compared to the number of passengers in order to make airports comparable. The 
same was done with the size of the terminal and the shopping area, as well as with the 
number of gates and check-in-counters. Narrow terminals can be a reflection of 
insufficient capacity. They may cause delays, stress and a negative experience. 
Terminal amenities such as shopping, catering and similar services ensure a 
comfortable and entertaining stay. In addition, they give an airport the possibility to gain 
independence from aeronautical businesses. Profits from the non-aeronautical field may 
enable the airport to offer better conditions on the aeronautical side and to strengthen 
its competitive position. 
The factors presented and discussed above are weighted according to their importance. 
Their influence reflects the results of the former studies mentioned in the last chapter. 
All specific weights were varied and seen as relatively robust. Variations do not change 
the hierarchy. Table 2 summarizes the structure and weights of attributes influencing 
the study. 
All airports offering a certain measure of size and traffic are taken into consideration as 
competitors for passengers living in Baden-Württemberg. A condition is that they have 
to serve at least 4 of the selected destinations. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
included airports. 
 
V. Results 
 
Table 4 presents the results. Based on these values, a ranking for all cells can be 
established. To analyze the competitive situation, a division into different zones is 
introduced. Referring to the highest value of a particular cell, two additional limiting 
values are set at 90% and 80% of the maximum value. The choice of these limits 
creates a sensible relation between potential improvements and competitive positions. 
Extensive investments should make an upper zone reachable, whereas incremental 
improvements should have no drastic effect on the new position. The limits are selected 
                                                 
33 See for instance data concerning Munich Airport in 2004 under www.munich-
airport.de/DE/Areas/Company/Daten/Verkehrsstrukturdaten/index.html: Car (47%), S-Bahn (31%), Taxi (10%), 
Bus (6%), Rental Car (6%). The relationship between public and private transport is also reflected in the 
construction of weights for measuring access quality (Table 2). 
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according to this aim. It should be noticed that under different circumstances, 
determination of limiting values could change. 
 
Table 4: Final results 
 
Airport Reference Point 
BSL FRA FDH INN MUC NUE SXB STR ZRH 
Aalen 3,0486 5,5193 5,0759 1,9218 6,4807 5,1408 3,3286 6,8431 4,7576
Baden-Baden 5,0736 6,8818 3,5759 1,7843 4,4557 3,0033 5,6911 6,2306 5,3076
Balingen 4,5736 5,4943 5,2134 1,7843 5,5182 2,3658 4,1286 6,8431 6,4201
Biberach an der Riß 3,4986 4,6943 5,8759 2,8593 6,6182 3,6158 2,8286 6,4556 5,8951
Böblingen 3,1861 6,1568 4,6009 1,7843 5,0932 3,7033 4,6286 6,9556 6,0326
Calw 3,9361 6,6568 4,2384 1,7843 4,4557 3,1408 5,1911 6,9556 5,7826
Emmendingen 6,4611 5,8568 3,7634 1,7843 4,4557 2,7533 5,1911 5,3181 6,4201
Esslingen 3,0736 6,2943 4,7134 1,7843 5,9307 3,5908 4,8536 6,9556 5,0326
Freiburg i. Breisgau 6,5736 5,7193 4,1509 1,7843 4,4557 2,7533 5,3036 5,2056 6,4201
Freudenstadt 5,1236 5,6068 4,1259 1,7843 4,5932 2,9783 5,3286 6,8181 6,1201
Friedrichshafen 5,2986 4,2193 5,8759 3,5843 5,5682 2,4783 2,4661 5,7056 7,0326
Göppingen 3,1861 5,6318 5,1009 1,7843 6,5682 3,7783 4,5786 6,9556 4,6451
Heidelberg 4,5986 7,7693 3,6884 1,7843 4,5682 3,7783 4,8036 6,4556 4,5576
Heidenheim an der 
Brenz 2,6861 5,5443 5,1884 2,2843 6,5932 5,1408 3,1911 6,8431 4,8701
Heilbronn 4,0736 7,2693 3,8259 1,7843 4,5682 4,6408 4,4161 6,9556 4,9451
Karlsruhe 5,0736 6,9943 3,6009 1,7843 4,5682 3,4158 5,1911 6,8431 4,6701
Künzelsau 3,1861 6,4318 3,9384 1,7843 5,7307 5,3658 3,9661 6,8431 4,8701
Lörrach 6,5736 5,3818 4,4634 2,6718 4,2057 2,2283 4,4661 4,9806 7,0326
Ludwigsburg 3,3236 6,5443 4,3009 1,7843 5,0682 4,3658 4,7411 6,9556 5,0576
Mannheim 4,8236 7,7693 3,5759 2,0593 4,7932 3,5783 4,8036 6,4556 4,6701
Mosbach 4,4611 7,3818 3,4634 2,0093 4,5682 4,4783 4,4661 6,8431 4,4451
Offenburg 5,8486 6,2693 3,9384 1,7843 4,4557 2,7533 5,8036 5,7306 5,4201
Pforzheim 4,8486 6,8818 3,6009 1,7843 4,8182 3,5908 5,1911 6,9556 4,5826
Ravensburg 4,4111 4,3318 5,8759 3,3343 6,1182 2,7283 2,5786 5,9806 6,8951
Reutlingen 3,0736 6,1568 4,9884 1,7843 5,6807 3,4283 4,2661 6,9556 5,7826
Rottweil 4,5736 5,3818 5,2384 1,7843 4,5932 2,9783 4,2161 6,9556 6,5326
Schwäbisch-Hall 3,0736 6,4318 4,0759 1,7843 5,5932 5,3658 3,9661 6,9556 4,8701
Sigmaringen 4,8236 4,7193 5,8759 2,0343 5,8182 2,7283 3,5786 6,1181 6,7576
Singen (Hohentwiel) 5,2986 4,7693 5,7384 2,4718 4,8182 2,3408 3,8036 5,7306 7,3076
Stuttgart 3,0736 6,5443 4,4384 1,7843 5,0682 4,2283 4,7411 6,9556 5,5576
Tauberbischofsheim 3,3236 7,4068 3,6884 1,7843 5,7307 4,9783 3,9661 6,7306 4,6701
Tübingen 3,7986 6,0443 4,8509 1,7843 5,3182 3,0658 4,1536 6,9556 6,2826
Tuttlingen 4,8236 5,0193 5,6259 2,1968 4,6807 2,6158 3,9411 6,4556 6,7826
Ulm 3,0236 4,8568 5,4884 2,6968 6,8432 3,9158 3,1036 6,8431 5,7076
Villingen-
Schwenningen 4,8236 5,1568 5,4884 2,0593 4,4557 2,7283 4,4161 6,5931 6,6451
Waiblingen 3,0736 6,5443 4,0509 1,7843 5,2307 4,4783 4,7411 6,9556 5,2826
Waldshut-Tiengen 6,1861 4,7693 4,8759 2,9468 4,6807 2,0908 4,0536 5,0931 7,4201
 
Source: D. Strobach 
 
With these limits, competition can be described from a district’s point of view. Area A 
(90%-100%) contains all competitors in proximity of the leading company; area B (80%-
90%) all those with a looser contact to the top. The occupation of these areas, 
especially the first one, shows how competitive a district is and how many airports are 
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considered as alternatives by passengers. For example, Karlsruhe has a maximum 
value of 6,994, reached by Frankfurt airport. But with Stuttgart airport in area A and no 
other challenger in area B, competition in this district tends to be duopolistic. Table 5 is 
an overview of the results related to this topic. 
 
Table 5: Division into zones and competition 
 
Reference Point Max. Value Leader
90%-
Mark 
Competitors 
Area A 
80%-
Mark 
Competitors 
Area B 
Aalen 6,8431 STR 6,1588 MUC 5,4745 FRA 
Baden-Baden 6,88175 FRA 6,1936 STR 5,5054 SXB 
Balingen 6,8431 STR 6,1588 ZRH 5,4745 MUC FRA 
Biberach an der Riß 6,6182 MUC 5,9564 STR 5,2946 ZRH FDH 
Böblingen 6,9556 STR 6,26 - 5,5645 FRA ZRH 
Calw 6,9556 STR 6,26 FRA 5,5645 ZRH 
Emmendingen 6,4611 BSL 5,815 ZRH FRA 5,1689 STR SXB 
Esslingen 6,9556 STR 6,26 FRA 5,5645 MUC 
Freiburg im Breisgau 6,5736 BSL 5,9162 ZRH 5,2589 FRA SXB 
Freudenstadt 6,8181 STR 6,1363 - 5,4545 ZRH FRA 
Friedrichshafen 7,0326 ZRH 6,3293 - 5,6261 FDH STR 
Göppingen 6,9556 STR 6,26 MUC 5,5645 FRA 
Heidelberg 7,76925 FRA 6,9923 - 6,2154 STR 
Heidenheim an der 
Brenz 6,8431 STR 6,1588 MUC 5,4745 FRA 
Heilbronn 7,26925 FRA 6,5423 STR 5,8154 - 
Karlsruhe 6,99425 FRA 6,2948 STR 5,5954 - 
Künzelsau 6,8431 STR 6,1588 FRA 5,4745 MUC 
Lörrach 7,0326 ZRH 6,3293 BSL 5,6261 - 
Ludwigsburg 6,9556 STR 6,26 FRA 5,5645 - 
Mannheim 7,76925 FRA 6,9923 - 6,2154 STR 
Mosbach 7,38175 FRA 6,6436 STR 5,9054 - 
Offenburg 6,26925 FRA 5,6423 BSL SXB STR 5,0154 ZRH 
Pforzheim 6,9556 STR 6,26 FRA 5,5645 - 
Ravensburg 6,8951 ZRH 6,2056 - 5,5161 MUC STR FDH 
Reutlingen 6,9556 STR 6,26 - 5,5645 FRA ZRH MUC 
Rottweil 6,9556 STR 6,26 ZRH 5,5645 - 
Schwäbisch-Hall 6,9556 STR 6,26 FRA 5,5645 MUC 
Sigmaringen 6,7576 ZRH 6,0818 STR 5,4061 FDH MUC 
Singen (Hohentwiel) 7,3076 ZRH 6,5768 - 5,8461 - 
Stuttgart 6,9556 STR 6,26 FRA 5,5645 - 
Tauberbischofsheim 7,40675 FRA 6,6661 STR 5,9254 - 
Tübingen 6,9556 STR 6,26 ZRH 5,5645 FRA 
Tuttlingen 6,7826 ZRH 6,1043 STR 5,4261 FDH 
Ulm 6,8432 MUC 6,1589 STR 5,4746 ZRH FDH 
Villingen-
Schwenningen 6,6451 ZRH 5,9806 STR 5,3161 FDH 
Waiblingen 6,9556 STR 6,26 FRA 5,5645 - 
Waldshut-Tiengen 7,4201 ZRH 6,6781 - 5,9361 BSL 
 
Source: D. Strobach 
 
Another 5 zones now can be developed to describe competition from an airport’s point 
of view. Zone 1 and 2 mark the areas where a particular airport has the leading role. In 
doing so, zone 1 describes the situation where no close competitors in zone A exist, 
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whereas zone 2 represents the competitive case of leadership. Within districts of zone 
3, the airport under view does not occupy the leading position anymore. It is situated in 
area A, closely competing with the leader. The distance between it and the leader 
grows, when ranked into zone 4. The attraction value now ranges within area B. The 
weakest competitive position is represented by zone 5, where an airport is no longer a 
strong competitor to the leaders. 
In the district of Tuttlingen, for example, Stuttgart airport has a position in area B 
(6,4556), with Zürich airport occupying the leading position (6,7826) and the airport at 
Friedrichshafen (5,6259) as competitor in area B. In the eyes of Stuttgart airport, the 
district of Tuttlingen belongs to zone 3. 
How these differentiations form a more precise picture of an airport’s catchment area, is 
shown with Figure 3 at the example of Stuttgart airport. Figure 4 illustrates the leading 
positions for all districts in Baden-Württemberg. 
A conspicuous fact is the influence of the Frankfurt airport reaching the South along the 
Rhine Valley. On one hand, the Black Forest creates a kind of natural barrier to the East 
with higher travel resistance. But on the other, the transport infrastructure along the 
Rhine Valley is excellently developed. Travelling to Frankfurt is getting more attractive, 
because despite longer distances, travel times are short. Contrary valuations of access 
time and cost for the Frankfurt airport in the Rhine Valley districts confirm this 
assumption. 
An existing traffic axis of road or railway infrastructure thus plays a vital role in the 
moulding of catchment areas. Along these axes, even in more distant regions, the 
connectivity can be adequate enough so that the higher supply of flights and 
destinations compensate for disadvantages in access quality. Another example are the 
two districts in the East of Baden-Württemberg which belong to the catchment area of 
Munich airport. Both have better access to Stuttgart airport than to Munich. But they are 
also both very well linked to the highway- and/or railway-network serving the Bavarian 
capital. This restricts the disadvantage of poorer access quality in a favourable way, so 
that it can be compensated by advantages on the airport-specific side. 
Therefore, it is no wonder that the most competitive districts are in the Rhine Valley 
(Emmendingen and Ortenaukreis) and in the East of Baden-Württemberg (Alb-Donau-
Kreis and Ulm). These findings support the assumption that competition is most intense 
in centrally located districts between two airports. Reasons for the two cases are 
mentioned above. 
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Figure 3: Catchment area and competitive zones of Stuttgart airport 
 
Source: D.Strobach 
 
Especially the Rhine Valley is an interesting case, because of the high density of 
competitors. The airports of Basel, Straßbourg and Stuttgart are in close proximity. 
Furthermore, the more distant hub airports of Frankfurt and Zürich are of great 
importance. It should be noted that three airports failed to be included into this survey 
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because of their minor size (Baden-Airpark Karlsruhe and Mannheim) or outstanding 
operating licence (Black-Forrest-Airport Lahr). As potential competitors, they could be of 
significance in the future. 
 
Figure 4: Competitive leadership of airports in Baden-Württemberg 
 
Source: D.Strobach 
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The lowest intensity of competition appears at the Swiss border (Singen). It is a typical 
example for the assumption that a district in close proximity to an airport, especially a 
hub airport, will be “ruled” by this company in a sense of undisturbed market power (in 
this case Zürich airport). 
Both assumptions concerning the spatial distribution of competitive forces and market 
power have to be interpreted as tendencies. According to these tendencies, it must be 
assumed that Stuttgart airport exerts a similar kind of distinct leading role in the centre 
of Baden-Württemberg. But the airport has only three districts (Böblingen, Freudenstadt, 
Reutlingen) assigned to zone 1. Within all other districts of its vicinity, the airport must 
deal with competitive pressures. Stuttgart airport is in the unlucky situation to face 
competition of large hub airports from three directions. Those three main competitors 
and the natural barrier in the West set the tone for developing a catchment area, in the 
end. For the hub airports, it is easier to compensate disadvantages and, therefore, 
enlarge their catchment area.  
 
VII. Outlook 
 
Concerning the widening of its catchment area, the potential for development of 
Stuttgart airport as the central airport of this study is limited. Together with EuroAirport 
Basel, it fills an intermediate position between hub and regional airports, especially 
when focusing on airport-specific factors. There is a risk of being stuck in the middle. 
But even with a difficult starting point, new opportunities are arising. The development of 
another classical hub does not seem a profitable strategy. But the attraction of charter 
and low cost airlines, as has happened in the recent past, could create growth. 
However, the dangers of too close ties to these types of airlines should be kept in mind. 
The new congress and exhibition centre (Landesmesse) built in the direct 
neighbourhood to the airport offers the opportunity to generate new traffic. As part of the 
project “Stuttgart 21”, a new long-distance train station is planned in front of the 
terminal. The example of Frankfurt airport shows that such an investment opens up the 
opportunity to better exploit more distant catchment areas and strengthen its own 
competitive position. 
Further studies could widen the geographical area examined or focus on several case 
studies. Lately a court judgement paved the way for conversion of the former military 
airfield at Memmingen into a regional airport. A case study approach could be used to 
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determine how the competitive environment could change and whether it makes sense 
to add a new regional airport in one of the densest airport networks in Europe. 
Another interesting field could be the further development of existing theoretical models, 
for example including highways or natural barriers, so to say areas of different travel 
resistance. 
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